In this paper we formalize routing in communication networks as a game between the designer of the routing algorithm and an attacker that attempts to intercept packets. By computing saddlepoint solutions to this game, we obtain stochastic routing policies that are secure in the sense that they utilize multiple paths to minimize the probability of packet interception. We also show that the policies obtained for secure routing can be optimal with respect t.o flowmaximization and load-balancing. These policies thus have applicahions beyond secure routing and may proof us&, e.g., in wireless networks, where bandwidth and power is at a premium.
Introduction
Current routing algorithms used in communication networks are vulnerable because the path over which a data packet travels is fairly predictable and easy to determine. This opens the door for packet intercep tion and/or eavesdropping by an attacker. Even when there are several paths between a source and destination, rout.ing algorithms typically select one of the possible options and utilize that path all the time. Nw table exceptions are Equal Cost Multi-Path (EChIP) [l] and OSPF Optimized Multi-Path (OSPF-OhlP) [a] .
However, these algorithms were developed to increase throughput and not to make routing robust to attacks. Therefore these algorithms make use of multiple paths (when these are available) but they do not introduce unpredictability and therefore packet interception is still fairly easy to achieve. Because the path that a 'The research presented in this paper was supported by D A W A and NSF. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the funding agencies.
0-7803-7516-5/02/$17.00 02002 IEEE packet follows in a network is easy to predict, attackers that want to intercept packets-x reconstruct a file from packets eavesdropped in the network-an achieve their goals with a minimum number of r e sources. E.g., by breaking into just one of the routers in the minimum-hop path.
In this paper we study the stochastic routing policies introduced in [3] . These policies are robust with respect to attempts at packet interception because they explore the unpredictability that can be achieved by routing packets through several alternative paths. As in [3] , we formalize the computation of stochastic routing policies as a game betu,een the designer of the policies and an adversary that attempts to intercept packets. In the present paper, we show that the offline policies proposed in 131 are actually saddlepoint solutions to the game and therefore not overly "conservative." We show this in a more general setting than the one in [3] , which allows us to handle, e.g., attacks to nodes. We should emphasize that secure stochastic routing is not an alternative to other IP layer security mechanisms, such as VPNs [4] and IPsec [5]. It is instead a complementary technique to enhance security in communication networks.
The remainder of this,paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the basic notation and formalize the secure routing problem as a zero-sum game. The saddle-point for the game is determined in Section 3 by reducing it to an equivalent flow game. In Section 4 we show how to solve the,flow game using linear programing. The resulting linear program provides alternative interpretations to secure routing's saddlepoint policies in terms of flowmaximization and load-balancing. Section 5 contains final remarks and directions for future research. The reader is referred to [6] for some of the proofs.
, .
Problem formulation
Consider a communication network with n nodes connected by unidirectional links. We denote by N and C the sets of nodes and links, respectively, and use the notation 5 to represent a link from node j to node i.
We assume that all the nodes in the network are connect,ed in the sense that it is possible to reach any node from any other node through a finite sequence of links.
Example 1. Figure 1 shows L[n] c L that exit from node n. Under this policy, when a packet arrives at a node n E N , it will be routed with probability TI through the link e := iiii' E L to the next-hop node n'. In the sequel, we denote by RSt, to the set of lists that satisfy (1) and therefore R,,, r e p resents the set of all stochastic routing policies. In this paper, we mostly consider cycle-free routing policies, i.e., policies for which a packet will never pass through the same node twice. Formally, R E RSt, is cycle-free when there is no sequence of links
with strictly positive probabilities rp > 0 for all I E S.
We denote by 'Rno-cycle the subset of RSt, consisting of cycle-free policies.
Example 2. Figure 2 shows an example of a stochastic routing policy from the source node s = 1 to the destination node d = 4. Under this policy, at each node the packets are routed with equal probability among 0 the possible options. This policy is cycle-free. l o design routing policies that are robust with respect to interception we consider a game in which an adversary attempts to intercept packets being routed through the network. This adversary is able to "attack" specific links (or more generally sets of links) and intercept packets traveling in these links. To formally define the problem we assume that the adversary can choose among a finite set P of possible pure attadis, each characterized by a list of probabilities P := {pp : @ E L}. When the attacker selects a specific pure attack P := {pi : e E f}, the probability that it is able to intercept a packet traveling in node e is given by Pe. E x a m p l e 3. Each pure attack could correspond to the adversary selecting one specific link to scan packets on. If the probability of successfully intercepting packets on a link that is being scanned is pintereept, the set of all pure attacks would be given by to attacks Pc, and Pes at links e3 = fi and e, = 22, respectively, each with a probability pintercept = 50% of successfully intercepting a packet that goes through the corresponding link.
attack could correspond t o the adversary selecting one specific node and scanning all packets that go through the node. If the probability of successfully intercepting packets on the node being scanned is pintercept, the set of all pure attacks would be given by
Psingle-node attacks := {pn : n e N},
wit.h each P,, := {pc : ! E L} consisting of a list for which pt is equal to pintercept for every link entering node n. Figure 4 shows two of the four possible single-node attacks for the network in Figure 1 . One could also imagine multi-node attacks or other forms of multi-link attacks that still fit in this general frame work. 0 ( R * , M * ) E Rno-cyc~e x 10, 1 1 ' for which
The cost ( 3 ) places no penalization on the number of links that a packet will cross from the source to the destination. However, in some cases one may want to favor shorter paths. This can be done by introducing a new random variable xe, r 2 0 that is equal to zero in case the packet is not intercepted and equal to ( l +~)~-' when the packet is intercepted a t the t hop. Suppose now that use consider the cost Suppose now that the adversary selects' one specific pure attack from those in the set P of pure attacks, according to a distribution' M f [0, 1Ip and routing is done according t o a specific routing policy R E R,,,.
We can then formalize the routing problem as a z e r e sum game between the designer of the routing algorithm and the adversary, in which the former attempts t o minimize the probability that the packet is intercepted whereas the later attempts t o maximize this probability. This probability can be written as the expected value of the random variable x that is equal t o 1 in case the packet is intercepted and equal to zero otherwise. The subscript R,M in the expected value emphasizes the fact t,hat the distribution of x depends both on the routing policy R and the distribution M that the adversary uses to select pure attacks. The main problem under consideration is to determine saddle-point solutions to the game with cost (3): Problem
Compute saddle-point policies
'We assume that the selection of the pure attack is statistically independent of the routing selections for the next-hop. *Given a finite set A, we denote by 10, l j A the set of distributions over A, i.e., the simplex with dimension equal to the number of elements in A. Our immediate goal is to compute E,q,u[Xr] for given R E R,t,, M E [0, 1Ip, r 2 0. To this effect, assume that the pure attack P := {pp : ! E L} E P was selected by the adversary and that routing is done according to a specific routing policy R := {re : e E L} E RSt,. Let then zl(t),CE L, t E {1,2, ...} denote the probability that a packet is routed through link a t time t and F i g u r e 4: Example of two out of the four possible single-node attacks for the network in Figure 1. (a) and (b) correspond to attacks P, and Pa at n o d s 2 and 4, respectively, each with a probability pintercept = 50% of successfully intercepting a packet that goes through the corresponding node.
has not yet been intercepted. Denoting by s the source node, we then have (ai)
V t E L ( 5 )
re e E C exits from node s and ze(t + 1) =TI (1 -p t r ) z e , ( t ) Vt > I, t E L,
where the summation is taken over the set L[e] of links that enter the node from which link e exits. Stacking all the {ze : e E C} into a column vector x we can write (5)-(6) as
Vt > 1, (8) where diag[R] and diag[P] denote diagonal matrices whose main diagonal contains the re and the pp, respectively; and A and c appropriately defined matrices that essentially encode the network connectivity. From (7)-(S), we conclude that, for every t 2 1,
We are now ready to express E R , M [ x~] in terms of R and A t . The proof of this lemma can be found in 161.
where x and 1 am the unique solutions (independent of P ) to
and The main difficulty in solving the Routing Game Prob lem 2 is that the cost (10) is generally not convex over R E RSt,. However, the relation specified by (13) between vectors x and policies R is in some sense oneto-one and will allow us to "convexify" the cost (10). To this effect, Let AOmt be a matrix with one row per node and one column per link such that the entry corresponding the node n and link e is equal to one if link e exits from node n and zero otherwise. Because of (1) and the definition of the A matrix, it is straightforward to verify that
is independent of the routing policy R and is also a matrix with one row per node and one columns per is also independent of R and has as one row per node with the entry corresponding to the source node s equal ) to one and all others equal to zero.
The following lemma (proved in [6]) establishes a one-
We are now ready to prove the main result: b o n e relation between the set of cycle-free stochastic policies (which is not convex in general) with a convex set. This will be the basis to solve the Routing Game 2. Assume that (15) holds for every E Rno--cycle, P E P . For L e m m a 2. Let X denote the set of vectors x := { x j 2 0 : e E L } that satisfy
x* using (20) .
(i)The set X is convex. Note that (15) 
Moreover, the norms of the vectors x E X can be bounded by a constant that is independent of R t cycle-free path from the source s to the destination d. This is the case, e.g., for singlelink and single-node attacks (cf. ~~~~~l~~ 3 and 4). Inspired by the two previous Lemmas we now define an auxiliary game that is easier to solve (mostly due to the convexity of X) and that we will use to construct the solution to the Routing Game Problem 2. P r o b l e m 3 (Flow Game). Given e 2 0, compute
Proof of Theorem
where x is the unique solution to (13). To verify that x belongs to X note that left-multiplying (13) by AOut we obtain (18) because of (16) This shows that the value of the game is equal to the inverse of the maximum flow p from source to destination, consistent with the Row conservation law = (1 + €)Ai,% + ps, and subject to the bandwidth constrains
For the single-link attacks in Example 3, ( 2 6 ) corresponds to a maximum bandwidth per link equal to l/pi,t,,,,pt, whereas for the singlenode attacks in Example 4 it corresponds to a maiimum processing per node equal to l/pinterCept~ Note also that since E is simply a scaled version of x , the optimal routing policy can be computed directly from f, using (20). This means that the routing policies that arise from the Routing Game Problem 2 also maximize throughput subject to the constrain (26).
The solution to the singlelink and singlenode attacks have alternative interpretations that stem directly from (24). In single-link attacks, row [P] z is equal to pintercept times the flow in the link corresponding to the P attack. Therefore, optimal routing for single-link attacks minimizes the maximum link-flow.
Similarly, in singlenode attacks, row [P] z is equal to pintercept times the flow that goes through the node corresponding to the P attack. Thus optimal routing for single-node at.tacks minimizes the'maximum node-flow. This means that the routing policies that arise from the Routing Game Problem 2 also achieve load-balancing. These policies thus also have application in problems where power is at a premium, such as in wireless networks.
Conclusions
In this paper we extended the game-theoretical formulation for secure routing originally proposed in [3] to more general attacks. We determined saddle-points for the resulting games by reducing them to equivalent flow games and provided interpretations for the secure routing's saddlepoint policies in terms of flowmaximization and load-balancing. In our current research, we investigate the use of these policies to increase network throughput and also to minimize energy consumption in wireless networks.
